December 14, 2011 |
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The United States is
withdrawing the last of its troops from Iraq this month, which makes now
an appropriate time to begin weighing the costs and benefits to U.S.
national security from our intervention there.
On
May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush stood aboard the deck of the
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declared to the country and to
the world that “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the
battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”
As
Americans would quickly find out, President Bush’s declaration of
victory was severely premature. Iraq would soon be in the throes of a
violent insurgency and, eventually, a full-blown sectarian civil war.
More
than eight years after that speech, as President Barack Obama prepares
to keep his promise to end the war, Iraq has made progress but still
struggles with insecurity and deep political discord. Though the level
of violence has remained down from its 2006–2007 peak—when dozens of
bodies could be found on Baghdad’s streets every morning—Iraq still
endures a level of violence that in any other country would be
considered a crisis. Still, the end of former Iraq President Saddam
Hussein’s brutal regime represents a considerable global good, and a
nascent democratic Iraqi republic partnered with the United States could
potentially yield benefits in the future.
But
when weighing those possible benefits against the costs of the Iraq
intervention, there is simply no conceivable calculus by which Operation
Iraqi Freedom can be judged to have been a successful or worthwhile
policy. The war was intended to show the extent of America’s power. It
succeeded only in showing its limits.
The tables and charts below tell the tale. We have grouped these costs into three categories:
- The human costs, dealing with American and Iraqi casualties
- The financial costs, dealing with the expense of the war and of the continued care for its veterans
- The strategic costs, dealing with the impact of the Iraq intervention on U.S. power and influence in the Middle East and on the global stage
Before turning to those tables and charts, however, we would like to make two additional points.
First,
it is critical to remember the shifting justifications for the U.S.
intervention in Iraq. The Iraq invasion was sold to the American public
on the basis of Saddam Hussein’s supposed possession of weapons of mass
destruction and his alleged relationship with Al Qaeda. When both claims
turned out to be false, the Bush administration justified the
intervention on the idea that a democratic Iraq would be an ally in the
“war on terror” and an inspiration for democratic reform in the Middle
East. These arguments remain, at best, highly questionable.
Second,
the authors would like to make clear that this analysis of the costs of
the Iraq war in no way diminishes the sacrifice, courage, and honor
displayed by the U.S. military in Iraq. Americans troops have served and
died in Iraq at the behest of the American people and two of their
commanders-in-chief. This is why it is important to draw the correct
lessons from our nation’s invasion of Iraq. In order to do that, its
costs must be examined honestly and rigorously.
Human costs
- Total deaths: Between 110,663 and 119,380
- Coalition deaths: 4,803
- U.S. deaths: 4,484
- U.S. wounded: 32,200
- U.S. deaths as a percentage of coalition deaths: 93.37 percent
- Iraqi Security Force, or ISF, deaths: At least 10,125
- Total coalition and ISF deaths: At least 14,926
- Iraqi civilian deaths: Between 103,674 and 113,265
- Non-Iraqi contractor deaths: At least 463
- Internally displaced persons: 1.24 million
- Refugees: More than 1.6 million
Financial costs
- Cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom: $806 billion
- Projected total cost of veterans’ health care and disability: $422 billion to $717 billion
Strategic costs
The foregoing costs could
conceivably be justified if the Iraq intervention had improved the
United States’ strategic position in the Middle East. But this is
clearly not the case. The Iraq war has strengthened anti-U.S. elements
and made the position of the United States and its allies more
precarious.
Empowered Iran in Iraq and region. The
Islamic Republic of Iran is the primary strategic beneficiary of the
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime
removed Iran’s most-hated enemy (with whom it fought a hugely
destructive war in the 1980s) and removed the most significant check on
Iran’s regional hegemonic aspirations. Many of Iraq’s key Iraqi Shia
Islamist and Kurdish leaders enjoy close ties to Iran, facilitating
considerable influence for Iran in the new Iraq.
Created terrorist training ground. According
to the U.K. Maplecroft research group’s most recent index, Iraq is the
third-most vulnerable country in the world to terrorism. The years of
U.S. occupation in Iraq created not only a rallying call for violent
Islamic extremists but also an environment for them to develop, test,
and perfect various tactics and techniques. These tactics and techniques
are now shared, both in person and via the Internet, with extremists
all over the region and the world, including those fighting U.S. troops
in Afghanistan.
Loss of international standing. While
abuses are perhaps inevitable in any military occupation, the images
and stories broadcast from Iraq into the region and around the world
have done lasting damage to the United States’ reputation as a supporter
of international order and human rights. Gen. David Petraeus has said
that the damage done to the United States’ image by Abu Ghraib is
permanent, calling it a “nonbiodegradable” event.
Diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. Rather
than stay and finish the job in Afghanistan as promised, the Bush
administration turned its focus to Iraq beginning in 2002, in
preparation for the 2003 invasion. Special Forces specializing in
regional languages were diverted from Afghanistan to Iraq, and Predator
drones were sent to support the war in Iraq instead of the hunt for Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Stifled democracy reform. While
the Arab Awakening of 2011 is a potentially positive development,
there’s no evidence that the Iraq war contributed to this in any
positive way. A 2010 RAND study concluded that, rather than becoming a
beacon of democracy, the Iraq war hobbled the cause of political reform
in the Middle East. The report stated that “Iraq’s instability has
become a convenient scarecrow neighboring regimes can use to delay
political reform by asserting that democratization inevitably leads to
insecurity.” Rather than supporting democratic forces in neighboring
Syria, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly voiced
support for Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.
Fueled sectarianism in region. The
invasion of Iraq replaced a prominent Sunni Arab State with one largely
controlled by Iraq’s Arab Shia majority. While the end of the
oppression of Iraq’s Shia majority is a positive thing, this shift has
exacerbated regional tensions between Shia and Sunni, including in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain (where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is
based). Lingering disputes in Iraq between Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds,
and Turkmen also continue to invite exploitation by both state and
non-state actors.
More detailed costs
Veterans
- Total U.S. service members who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan: More than 2 million
- Total Iraq/Afghanistan veterans eligible for VA health care: 1,250,663
- Total Iraq/Afghanistan veterans who have used VA health care since FY 2002: 625,384 (50 percent of eligible veterans)
- Total Iraq/Afghanistan veterans with PTSD: At least 168,854 (27 percent of those veterans who have used VA health care; does not include Vet Center or non-VA health care data)
- Suicide rate of Iraq/Afghanistan veterans using VA health care in FY 2008: 38 suicides per 100,000 veterans
- National suicide rate, 2007: 11.26 per 100,000 Americans
Iraq reconstruction (as of September 30, 2011)
- Total funding: $182.27 billion
- Iraqi government funds (including Coalition Provisional Authority spending): $107.41 billion
- International funds: $13.03 billion
- U.S. funds (2003-2011): $61.83 billion
- Total U.S. unexpended obligations: $1.66 billion